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80 
23ANDPLEASEDONOTDENYME: THE INSURANCE COVERAGE BACKLASH 
CONSUMERS SUFFER WHEN HUMAN IDENTITY BECOMES A COMMODITY 
 




Today, consumers purchase at-home genetic tests for a myriad of 
reasons.  Some people want to become more informed about their bodies 
and their health, some people are curious about the science behind why they 
sneeze when they look into a bright light, others might seek information 
about their global heritage in an increasingly connected world, still others 
may be looking for their biological families or unknown relatives.  The 
more that consumers utilize direct-to-consumer (“DTC”) genetic tests like 
the ones offered by 23andMe, the more genetic data becomes available to 
researchers and scientists.1  This increase in information leads to 
discoveries both novel and life-saving.2  But lurking under the surface of 
all this personal and scientific revelation is a dangerous undercurrent for the 
very consumers who quite literally offer themselves up for the betterment 
of society.3  
 This comment advocates for greater consumer protections in the 
area of genetic testing and the life and disability insurance marketplace.  
Part I provides a history of 23andMe, showing how the company has turned 
certain regulatory setbacks into strengths.  Part II explores the background 
of the current laws surrounding life insurance discrimination, data mining, 
and DTC genetic testing research.  Part III explains how consumers consent 
to 23andMe research, data exhaust and data mining, and the accumulation 
of data by 23andMe for their research.  Part IV covers the growing problems 
with re-identifying consumers from de-identified data.  Part V is a 
discussion on the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act which 
 
    * Megan A. Rogers-Hasie is a Kansas City, Missouri native and December 
2020 graduate of Mississippi College School of Law.  The author would like to thank 
Dean Jonathan Will for his direction and support throughout the drafting of this article. 
The author would also like to thank her husband, parents, family, and friends for their 
love and encouragement. 
     1. Katherine Drabiak, Article: Caveat Emptor: How the Intersection of Big 
Data and Consumer Genomics Exponentially Increases Informational Privacy Risks, 27 
Health Matrix 143, 152-53 (2017). 
     2. 23andMe, https://www.23andme.com/ (last visited March 5, 2020). 
     3. Drabiak, supra note 1, at 156. 
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prohibits health insurance companies from discriminating against 
consumers for their genetics but does not extend that same protection to life 
insurance consumers.  Part VI looks to the advances made by the study of 
genomics while Part VII suggests solutions to better protect consumers of 
DTC genetic testing. 
 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF 23ANDME 
 
 23andMe offers in-home genetic testing to determine ancestry for 
as low as $99.00.4  This testing tells the consumer which part of the world 
their ancestors came from and can help the consumer locate family 
members who have also used 23andMe’s services.5  For the more curious 
consumer, 23andMe offers a “Health Service” in conjunction with their 
ancestry service.6  This testing, priced at either $199.00 or $499.00, 
depending on how much information you want, educates the consumer as 
to certain health predispositions, such as whether the consumer is positive 
for cancer-causing genes like BRCA1 and BRCA2.7  
 The process is quite simple, once a consumer has selected their 
product of choice, 23andMe sends out a testing kit which includes a tube 
for the consumer’s saliva.8  After the consumer has returned their DNA 
sample, 23andMe provides results within 3-5 weeks.9  Consumers have 
access to their raw data, whatever analyses they’ve selected from 23andMe, 
and they can register their data through 23andMe’s app.10  Once the analysis 
is complete, consumers can participate in 23andMe research.11  Per the 
company’s website, “[t]he choice to opt into or out of research is always up 
to the participant.”12  The company states that on average, a participant’s 
data is used in over 230 studies and over 80% of consumers opt-in to the 
research.13 
 
     4. Compare our DNA Tests, 23andMe, https://www.23andme.com/compare-
dna-tests/?vip=true (last visited Oct. 29, 2019). 
     5. Id. 
     6. Id. 
     7. Id. 
     8. How it Works, 23andMe, https://www.23andme.com/howitworks/?vip=true 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2019). 
     9. Id. 
   10. Compare our DNA Tests, supra note 4; The 23andMe Mobile DNA Reports 
App, 23andMe, https://customercare.23andme.com/hc/en-us/articles/212193898-The-
23andMe-Mobile-DNA-Reports-App (last visited Oct. 29, 2019). 
   11. Research – 23andMe, 23andMe, 
https://www.23andme.com/research/?vip=true (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
   12. Id. 
   13. Id.; About Us – 23andMe Media Center, 23andMe, 
https://mediacenter.23andme.com/company/about-us/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
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 Today, 23andMe boasts over 12,000,000 customers.14  The 
company’s path to success has not been without regulatory setbacks though. 
The United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) sent the 
company a warning letter in November of 2013 because 23andMe had 
violated the agency’s Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act by selling its 
saliva kits and genome testing without first securing FDA approval.15  The 
offending 23andMe product was the company’s Personal Genome Service 
which assessed risk for breast cancer and Alzheimer’s among other traits 
and conditions.16  The FDA warned of misbranding due to false positives 
or false negatives in addition to concerns about 23andMe’s lack of 
validation of the health claims made by the testing service.17  As a result, 
the company ceased selling the Personal Genome Service in the United 
States but maintained sales of the ancestry service and continued selling the 
Personal Genome Service in the United Kingdom and Canada.18   While the 
warning letter has since been removed from the FDA’s website, a copy is 
still available through the Business Insider website.19 
 
II. CURRENT LAWS AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
 The consumer data stored by 23andMe doesn’t just hold value in its 
scientific worth, the genetic profiles are a lucrative commodity attractive to 
pharmaceutical companies, insurance companies, and the data miners who 
track our every click, purchase, and location.20  As long as data mining is 
legal, DTC genetic testing companies can sell data from their bank of 
genome profiles, and insurance companies can deny life insurance coverage 
based on the results.21  Consumers often must self-report their genetic tests 
to life insurance companies and consumer data is available for purchase 
from data miners.22  Consumers need protection so they aren’t 
discriminated against because they took a genetic test. 
 
 
   14. About Us, supra note 13. 
   15. Megan Rose Dickey, The FDA Wants 23andMe to Stop Marketing its 
Genetic Testing Kits, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 25, 2013, 10:08 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/fda-sends-warning-letter-to-23andme-2013-11.  
   16. Drabiak, supra note 1, at 149-51. 
   17. Dickey, supra note 15. 
   18. Drabiak, supra note 1, at 151. 
   19. Dickey, supra note 15. 
   20. Drabiak, supra note 1, at 157. 
   21. Id. 
   22. Christina Farr, If You Want Life Insurance, Think Twice Before Getting A 
Genetic Test, FAST COMPANY (Feb. 17, 2016), 
https://www.fastcompany.com/3055710/if-you-want-life-insurance-think-twice-before-
getting-genetic-testing. 
2021] 23ANDPLEASEDONOTDENYME 83 
A. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
 
 The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”) 
prohibits health insurance companies from using a consumer’s genetic 
information as a basis for providing or denying coverage.23  The law, which 
took more than thirteen years to pass in Congress, was designed to promote 
“an age of genetic medicine” while providing necessary safeguards.24 
Genetic tests cannot be used in determining a consumer’s premium, nor can 
the genetic information be considered a pre-existing condition.25  GINA 
also prohibits employers with more than fifteen employers from hiring, 
firing, or otherwise discriminating against employees based on the 
employee’s genetic information.26  Prior to the Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”), pre-existing conditions could be grounds for denying health 
insurance coverage.27  For as long as the ACA is good law, pre-existing 
conditions cannot be the determinative factor of whether or not a health 
insurance company will insure an applicant.28  However, the safeguards of 
GINA and the ACA do not extend to life or disability insurance providers.29 
Early versions of GINA included protections in life and disability 
insurance, not just health insurance.30  However, these provisions were 
dropped after hard lobbying by life and disability insurance providers.31 
Because of the difficulties in getting GINA through both chambers of 
Congress, proponents of the bill compromised on the broadness of the bill’s 
protections.32  One advocate for GINA described focusing efforts on health 
insurance and employment discrimination, where the law’s protections 
were most needed, since not everyone purchases a life insurance policy.33 
Currently, life and disability insurance companies can request a potential 
 
   23. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 
101(a)(3)(A), 122 Stat. 881, 883 (2008). 
  24. Andrew Pollack, Congress Near Deal on Genetic Test Bias Bill, NYTIMES 
(Apr. 23, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/business/23gene.html. 
   25. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 101(d)(1-2). 
   26. Sejin Ahn, Whose Genome Is It Anyway?: Re-Identification and Privacy 
Protectionin [sic] Public and Participatory Genomics, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 751, 775-
76 (2015). 
   27. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 
1101(d)(3), 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
   28. Id. 
   29. Ahn, supra note 26, at 777. 
   30. Farr, supra note 22. 
   31. Id. 
  32. Sarah Zhang, The Loopholes in the Law Prohibiting Genetic 
Discrimination, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/03/genetic-discrimination-law-
gina/519216/. 
  33. Id. 
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client’s genetic test results and deny coverage if the potential client is not 
forthcoming about having had a genetic test performed.34  Life and 
disability insurance companies can also deny coverage if the potential 
client’s genetic test indicates a predisposition for certain illnesses or 
diseases, even if that person never develops the illness or disease or takes 
preventative measures.35  It is not only the shortcomings in GINA that leave 
DTC genetic testing consumers at risk.  The Supreme Court’s decision in 
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. allows for the sale and data mining of consumer 
genetic data which presents a risk for consumer privacy and insurance 
coverage. 
 
B. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. 
 
 In June of 2011, the Supreme Court found constitutional support for 
selling consumer data in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.36  The case centered 
around the practice of pharmacies selling information about the prescribing 
practices of doctors to data miners – companies that take consumer data and 
repackage it as a commodity that can be sold to marketing and advertising 
firms, insurance companies, and even political campaigns.37  The data 
mining at the heart of Sorrell converted a physician’s prescription pad into 
data that was sold or leased to pharmaceutical companies.38  Pharmaceutical 
companies then utilize this data to market new brand-name prescriptions to 
doctors they believe will be more likely to prescribe the drug.39  To combat 
this practice, the state of Vermont enacted the Prescription Confidentiality 
Law, which (1) prohibited pharmacies from selling this data for the purpose 
of pharmaceutical marketing, (2) prohibited pharmacies from allowing 
prescriber data to be used for marketing, and (3) prohibited pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and marketers from using prescriber data for marketing.40 
The Court consolidated two suits, one brought by the data miners and one 
brought by an association of pharmaceutical manufacturers.41 While the 
 
   34. Farr, supra note 22. 
   35. Id. 
   36. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011). 
   37. Id. at 558; Lois Beckett, Everything We Know (So Far) About Obama’s 
Big Data Tactics, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 29, 2012, 10:45 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/everything-we-know-so-far-about-obamas-big-data-
operation; Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore, & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump 
Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, NYTimes (Mar. 17, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-
campaign.html. 
   38. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 558 (2011).  
   39. Id. 
   40. Id. at 558-59. 
   41. Id. at 561. 
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United States District Court for the District of Vermont upheld the law, the 
Second Circuit reversed.42  Due to a circuit split with the First Circuit 
upholding similar laws in Maine and New Hampshire, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and affirmed the Second Circuit’s holding.43 
 The Supreme Court, like the Second Circuit, decided the case on 
First Amendment grounds.44  Although the Vermont legislature made 
several findings relating to the practice of prescribing name brand 
medications, pharmaceutical sales, and data mining, the sole effect of the 
Prescription Confidentiality Law was to chill commercial speech in 
violation of the First Amendment.45  The Court did note that even with the 
Prescription Confidentiality Law in place, pharmacies were free to 
disseminate prescriber data for “health care research.”46 
 
C. The Food and Drug Administration 
 
 Less than a decade after the Court’s decision in Sorrell, the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA) legalized the use of DTC Genetic Testing 
for the purpose of pharmacogenetics for the first time in October of 2018.47 
Per the FDA, “[p]harmacogenetics is the process of understanding what, if 
any, role genetics plays in a patient’s reaction to drugs.”48  Specifically, the 
FDA authorized 23andMe, one of the largest companies in the field of DTC 
Genetic Testing, to market a test that informs consumers of whether their 
genetics prohibit the absorption of certain medications.49  This FDA 
approval came in the wake of 23andMe’s $300,000,000 partnership with 
pharmaceutical company, GlaxoSmithKline (“GSK”) on July 25, 2018.50 
The partnership between 23andMe and GSK is intended to include only 
those 80% of 23andMe consumers that have opted in to the company’s 
research while maintaining consumer confidentiality.51  As Justice 
Kennedy speculated when writing the majority opinion for Sorrell in 2011, 
 
   42. Id. at 561-62. 
   43. Id. at 562. 
   44. Id. at 557. 
   45. Id. at 560-61, 565. 
   46. Id. at 559. 
   47. Press Release, Food and Drug Administration, FDA Authorizes First 
Direct-to-Consumer Test for Detecting Genetic Variants that may be Associated with 
Medication Metabolism (Oct. 31, 2018) (on file with author). 
   48. Id. 
   49. Id. 
   50. Press Release, GlaxoSmithKline, GSK and 23andMe sign agreement to 
leverage genetic insights for the development of novel medicines (25 July 2018) (on file 
with author). 
   51. Id. 
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consumer data has been converted into a marketing tool for “health care 
research.”52 
D. And Thus, the Problem 
 
 There is now a clear relationship between DTC genetic testing, 
manufacturers of pharmaceutical drugs, and the availability of the data from 
that testing to health, life, and disability insurers.  Without legislative 
intervention in the form of an amendment to GINA, consumers who have 
contributed their genetic makeup to scientific research or who have had 
genetic testing performed as an early preventative measure for serious 
diseases, can and will be denied life and disability insurance.  These same 
consumers may find that they cannot get health insurance payments for 
certain medications because the available data shows that medication is not 
suitable for the consumer in terms of pharmacogenetics.  While it is fair that 
a health insurance company would not want to pay for medication that 
won’t help the consumer, genetic testing is rife with false positives and 
inaccurate results.  The medicine that data suggests will not help the 
consumer may actually be a life-saving treatment.  The appeal of databases 
like 23andMe’s is the mass amount of genetic information coupled with 
self-reported health issues and individual characteristics.  But the risk of 
rejection of life and disability insurance or denial of health insurance claims 
will discourage consumers from partaking in DTC genetic testing.  This 
will hinder scientific progress and possibly cause otherwise preventable or 
treatable diseases to run rampant.  Improved approaches by regulatory 
bodies like the FDA and updated legislation by Congress is needed to 
preserve consumer protections and advance the future of medical studies. 
 
III. DEEP DIVE INTO THE DATA POOL 
 
 Between GINA, the Sorrell decision, and the FDA’s approval of 
using consumer data for the research of pharmacogenetics, there is now a 
gap in protection for consumers who may later seek life or disability 
insurance coverage.  The problem begins with data miners who sell 
prescriber information to willing buyers such as pharmaceutical 
manufacturers and insurance companies.53  Data miners also track and sell 
other data, online data such as social media likes and comments, websites 
visited, purchases made; physical data like our location, age, profession, 
and sexual orientation; and now with the boom in DTC genetic testing and 
pharmacogenetic studies, data miners can sell a consumer’s very DNA.54 
 
   52. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 559. 
   53. Id. at 558. 
   54. Drabiak, supra note 1, at 146-47. 
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As worrisome as it is that all this data is available to data miners, consumers 
have already self-reported this information to 23andMe directly.55  While 
23andMe promises to de-identify consumers’ data during the research 
process,56 re-identification is not only possible but has been achieved 
through multiple studies.57  Re-identification is discussed in detail below. 
All of this information is widely available, legally so, allowing life 
insurance companies to make determinations about coverage without truly 
considering the applicant as a human.58  To their detriment, consumers 
become reduced to statistical projections.59  
 
A. Changing Notions of Informed Consent 
 
 The FDA’s 2013 reprimand caused 23andMe to shut down its most 
lucrative and scientifically advanced department.60  Not to be deterred, 
23andMe then began to grow its database of genetic profiles by marketing 
the ancestry component of its business and providing consumers with their 
raw genetic data.61  The company’s long-term goal is now to amass its 
database of genetic profiles and to sell access to that database.62  It is the 
volume of this database that attracts research partners and contracts with 
pharmaceutical companies. 
 Although 23andMe has partnered with other companies in the 
past,63 the partnership with GSK is the first study that has been FDA-
sanctioned.64  23andMe has turned an FDA rebuke into FDA success to the 
tune of $300,000,000.  With this partnership comes questions concerning 
those who have submitted their DNA to 23andMe and have consented to 
the company’s research. One needs only to think of Henrietta Lacks to 
realize the pitfalls that come with uninformed human research subjects.65 
 
   55. Id. at 157-58. 
   56. Id. at 158. 
   57. Ahn, supra note 26, at 767-70. 
   58. Id. at 764-66. 
   59. Id. at 770-71. 
   60. Drabiak, supra note 1, at 149-51. 
   61. Id. at 151-52. 
   62. Id. at 152-53. 
   63. Id. at 151, 154. 
   64. Food and Drug Administration, supra note 47; GlaxoSmithKline, supra 
note 50. 
   65. Henrietta Lacks, the woman who became the source of the HeLa cell line, 
was an unwitting human research subject – both in life and in death.  The biopsy of her 
cancer cells was used for research without Henrietta’s consent or knowledge, and her 
family has never been compensated for the discoveries that have resulted from 
Henrietta’s cell line. Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Elizabeth Pike, Article: Consuming 
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 The Common Rule, which is a federal regulation for studies 
involving human research subjects, only applies to federally funded 
research.66  Because the 23andMe and GSK project is between two private 
companies, the Common Rule is not applicable.  Even still, the Common 
Rule is useful in considering the effectiveness of 23andMe’s consumer 
consent process.  Under the Common Rule, informed consent consists of 
describing the research procedure, explaining risks and benefits, offering 
the right to withdraw from the study, and a degree of confidentiality.67 
23andMe encourages consumers to join the company’s research efforts and 
provides consumers with a Research Consent.68  The Research Consent 
informs consumers that the company’s goal is “to make and support 
meaningful scientific discoveries.”69  The Research Consent covers 
research done by 23andMe, research done with partner companies, the 
publication of research in peer-reviewed journals, and research funded by 
the National Institutes for Health and other federal government grants.70 
Signing the Research Consent is mandatory to partake in 23andMe research 
and the company informs consumers that the consent is comparable with 
consent documents required by the Common Rule.71 
 But questions linger that this consent is not enough given the rapidly 
advancing nature of genome research and the number of studies a 
consumer’s data will be involved in.  In its Research Consent, 23andMe 
informs consumers of the lengths the company goes to protect consumer 
data physically, technically, and administratively.72  However, the company 
does not commit to whether it will require its third-party partners to protect 
a consumer’s confidentiality.73  The company references GINA on its 
website but is not forthcoming in regards to the limits of the protection that 
legislation offers.74  The Research Consent does inform consumers that re-
identified data may be made available to insurance companies which could 
have a negative impact on the consumer’s ability to obtain insurance 
coverage.75  As a safeguard for itself, 23andMe denies any liability for risks 
 
Genomics: Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Genetic and Genomic Information, 92 NEB. 
L. REV. 677, 681-82 (2014). 
   66. Ahn, supra note 26, at 778-79. 
   67. Id. at 778. 
   68. Drabiak, supra note 1, at 155-56. 
   69. Id. at 155. 
   70. Id. 
   71. Angela L. Morrison, Note, A Research Revolution: Genetic Testing 
Consumers Become Research (and Privacy) Guinea Pigs, 9 J. on Telecomm. & High 
Tech. L. 573 (2011). 
   72. Drabiak, supra note 1, at 156-57. 
   73. Morrison, supra note 71. at 586. 
   74. Id. 
   75. Drabiak, supra note 1, at 157. 
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experienced by consumers as a result of their purchase of 23andMe 
products.76  In short, consumers may be topically aware of the 
consequences of genetic testing but there are sizeable gaps in both the 
information provided and how that information is provided.  Such gaps 
suggest the consent is not informed, or at least not as informed as it should 
or ought to be given the risks to the consumer. 
 
B. Data: Our Digital Footprint 
 
 As evidenced in Sorrell, data is valuable to pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.77  But prescription data is a small fraction of the available 
data about a consumer that has value.  “Data exhaust,” data about what we 
look at, where we have been, and what we have bought, includes social 
media likes, interests, and photos.78  Commercial databases track our 
purchases while fitness bands monitor exercise, heart rate, location, and 
sleeping habits.79  Smart watches also track our location, our purchases, and 
our communications in conjunction with our mobile phones.80  
 A person’s entire internet presence is tracked through technology 
called cookies, action tags, and web bugs.81  Cookies, action tags, and web 
bugs are embedded in nearly every website we visit.82  This technology is 
useful for recording limited categories of information like passwords and 
browser history.83  Cookies make functions like “autofill” possible.84 
Cookies  like Google’s DoubleClick provide targeted ads to users based on 
the information gathered by the cookie.85  Google’s DoubleClick 
accumulates a large quantity of data from consumers because it tracks each 
website the consumer visits which is how it is able to offer a targeted ad on 
Facebook based on a consumer’s visit to the 23andMe website.86  Action 
tags, or web bugs as they may be known, record mouse movements and 
keystrokes that were not submitted to the webpage.87  This data gets written 
into the consumer’s cookie.88  Within thirty minutes of web searching, 
 
   76. Id. 
   77. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 552. 
   78. Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, Article: The New Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 205, 207-08 (2012); Drabiak, supra note 1, at 146. 
   79. Drabiak, supra note 1, at 146-47. 
   80. Bambauer, supra note 78, at 239-42. 
   81. Id. 
   82. Id. at 239-40. 
   83. Id. at 240. 
   84. Id. at 240-41. 
   85. Id. 
   86. Id. at 240. 
   87. Id. at 241. 
   88. Id. at 241-42. 
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cookies can acquire data relating to a consumer’s social media, age, 
location, employment, and sexual orientation, just to name a few identifiers. 
Although industry standards require that cookies must be encrypted and 
cannot contain malicious code or be visible to others,89 this is still a lot of 
personal information in the hands of corporate bodies who can turn around 
and sell aggregated data. 
 
C. 23andMe Houses All This Data 
 
 As has been demonstrated, 23andMe has a massive database of 
consumer data.  When it comes to the individual consumer, the company 
has raw genetic data, self-reported health histories, and family histories, 
name, race, sexual orientation, and age.90  The company’s privacy statement 
informs consumers that in addition to research purposes, the company can 
use consumer data for other purposes, such as targeted marketing and 
advertising.91  23andMe achieves this goal through the use of cookies and 
web bugs which track IP addresses and clickstream data.92  Through web 
tracking, the company also has consumer social media information, 
employer information, photos, a record of websites visited, and real-time 
geo-tracking.93  23andMe gains this information in part through self-
reported consumer information as part of the testing process.  But the 
company also encourages consumers to share their purchase and results of 
23andMe genome testing on social media websites like Facebook and 
LinkedIn.  Consumers that do so grant 23andMe access to their photos, 
network, gender, age, and list of friends.94  This data may be retained by 
23andMe and shared with third parties without consumer consent if the data 
has been de-identified.95 
 
IV. THE INEVITABILITY OF RE-IDENTIFICATION 
 
 True de-identification of consumer DNA is arguably impossible and 
re-identification is all but unavoidable.  After all, DNA is specific to the 
consumer, differentiating that consumer from every other human on the 
planet. Human beings share close to 99% of the same DNA, it is the 1% of 
 
   89. Id. 
   90. Drabiak, supra note 1, at 156. 
   91. Privacy Highlights § (2)(c), 23andMe, 
https://www.23andme.com/about/privacy/ (last updated Jan. 1, 2020) [hereinafter 
Privacy Highlights]. 
   92. Id. at § (2)(a)(v). 
   93. Drabiak, supra note 1, at 159. 
   94. Id. at 157-159. 
   95. Id. at 158-59. 
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variation in conjunction with environmental factors that leads to 
distinctions in hair and eye color, health conditions, and personality traits.96 
It is these variations in DNA that interest data scientists.97  Having a large 
genomic database is essential to understanding variations from consumer to 
consumer.98  During consumer intake, 23andMe obtains three kinds of 
information about the consumer.99  The company gets Registration 
Information which includes name, email address, and credit card 
information.100  Genetic Information consists of the consumer’s DNA 
sample and the data generated by it.101  Self-Reported Information includes 
the consumer’s survey responses telling 23andMe about diagnoses, medical 
history, and family history.102  For data profiles that enter the research 
arena, the genetic and self-reported information is aggregated and stripped 
of registration identifiers.103 
 23andMe’s Research Consent informs consumers that their 
genomic data and self-reported health histories will be used for research 
conducted by both 23andMe and 23andMe’s research partners.104  The self-
reported consumer data includes family history, current health status, 
personal traits, age, racial origin, sexual orientation, and ethnicity.105 
23andMe’s Privacy Statement says consumer data is combined with data 
from other users to minimize the risk of re-identification but as studies have 
shown, re-identification is probable.106  And despite this assurance, 
23andMe retains enough consumer information, highly personal and 
individualistic information at that, that re-identification is entirely 
possible.107  De-identified data can be cross-referenced with social media, 
self-reported health information, and publicly accessible ancestry websites 
such as GEDmatch to re-identify the specific consumer.108  For instance, a 
teenager was able to re-identify his anonymous sperm donor father through 
genotyping and searching the internet.109  Data scientists have successfully 
re-identified consumers whose DNA was available on public genome 
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databases.110  Re-identification is not only concerning for safety and 
privacy reasons, re-identification can cause stigma, shame, discrimination, 
and even criminal accusations for the individual consumer and their 
relatives.111 
 Anytime a consumer shares their genetic data, the possibility arises 
that someone will reconstruct the data to identify the individual behind it.112 
A Massachusetts governor was identified in a database of publicly available 
de-identified patient records.113  Using birth date, sex, zip code, and a 
widely reported hospitalization, a researcher was able to pair anonymous 
data with a very real human – the governor.114  Similar studies prompted 
the National Institutes of Health to remove genetic data from public 
websites out of concern for consumer privacy.115  DTC genetic testing 
generally involves examination of up to a million genetic variations, but a 
2004 study found only thirty are needed to differentiate one data set from 
another.116 
 Aggregate data held by 23andMe and their partners may be made 
public through research findings or released to insurance companies.117 
23andMe does advise consumers in their Research Consent that 
information given to insurance companies may affect a consumer’s ability 
to obtain insurance coverage.118  The company retains the rights to use all 
consumer data for non-research purposes as allowed by law, and for 
targeted marketing and advertising.119  
Thus, the risks of re-identification extend to the 20% of 23andMe 
consumers who do not opt into research as well as the 80% of consumers 
who do. 
 For consumers who seek to revoke their consent to research, 
23andMe will cease use of that individual’s data in the future, but the data 
will remain part of past and on-going research.120  In the event a consumer 
wants to withdraw their consent from 23andMe research, they can do so 
through the company’s webpage or app but it will take up to 30 days to 
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remove that consumer from the research database.121  Withdrawing consent 
does not remove a consumer’s data from ongoing research or from data 
pools submitted to third-party research partners, like GSK.122  Nor does 
withdrawing consent remove a consumer’s data from published research.123 
Whether or not a person has enrolled in 23andMe research, their genetic 
data exists in the company’s database indefinitely.124  Requests for entire 
removal of data from 23andMe’s database does not guarantee the company 
will not use the data for sequencing in the future or deny a third-party to 
retain consumer genomic information or a backup copy of it.125  The data 
retention includes the full genomic sequence, the self-reported health 
information which is highly personal and identifiable, and the fact that the 
consumer underwent 23andMe genome testing.126  Once a consumer sends 
their tube of saliva to 23andMe, their data is liable to become part of the 
ether for the rest of time. 
 The mass amount of data 23andMe holds for each consumer 
multiplied by over 10,000,000 customers makes the company a desirable 
target for cyber-attacks.127  Despite the company’s best efforts at privacy, 
an internet hacker could access the consumer database and sell the data to 
the highest bidder or post it freely on the web. This was almost a reality for 
a 23andMe rival company, Ancestry, in 2014.128  Further, one study 
concluded that synthetic DNA submitted by a consumer under false 
pretenses could possibly be encoded with malware to infiltrate DNA 
processing programs.129  These are yet additional reasons for updated 
legislation that protects consumers from discrimination in the event that 
their data becomes publicly available. 
 
V. THE INSURANCE COMPANY LOOPHOLE 
 
 GINA’s protections extend only to workplace and health insurance 
discrimination.130  This loophole allows life, disability, and long-term care 
insurance companies to utilize genetic testing results to deny applicants.131 
23andMe’s privacy statement informs consumers their data may be used by 
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the company as the company deems acceptable by current laws and 
regulations.132  This can certainly include releasing aggregate data to 
insurance companies who may then initiate a re-identification process of 
their own.  Similarly, aggregate data may be sold or leased to data miners 
who may seek to re-identify the numbers of consumers compiled in that 
aggregate data for purposes of making life or disability insurance coverage 
determinations. 
 Fears of re-identification and discrimination may seem fantastical, 
but life insurance denial based on genetic testing is already a reality.  In 
2016, a report surfaced of a thirty-six year old, healthy woman who’d been 
denied life insurance coverage because of a positive BRCA 1 gene.133  A 
positive BRCA 1 or 2 gene does not definitively indicate a person will 
develop breast or ovarian cancer but it does raise the person’s risk from 
about twelve percent to fifty-five or sixty-five percent that the cancer will 
develop.134  Knowing about a positive BRCA gene early gives patients an 
advantage in decreasing the risk they will get sick.135  Angelina Jolie 
famously penned an op-ed in 2013 about her positive BRCA gene and 
choice to undergo a double mastectomy to minimize any risk of developing 
breast cancer.136  Many consumers, like Angelina Jolie, when faced with 
the news of a potential health risk, use the opportunity to take preventative 
measures and improve their overall health.137 
 The gap in GINA protections leave consumers stuck between a rock 
and a hard place.  If a person wants to get an idea of future health 
complications, they do so at the risk of losing or not being able to obtain 
life or disability insurance.138  Northwestern Mutual, a life insurance 
company, for instance, doesn’t require that applicants submit to genetic 
testing, but will deny an applicant if they are not forthcoming about past 
genetic testing.139  The reasoning behind GINA was that the legislation 
allows for scientific advancements while protecting consumers.140 
 Life and disability insurance companies employ actuaries to 
determine whether an applicant is a safe choice to insure.141  With the 
amount of genetic data available with the Human Genome Project, 
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GEDmatch, and others, insurance companies can easily employ data 
hackers to match available data exhaust to an applicant’s file to determine 
genetic predispositions not otherwise available to the company.142  The 
biggest danger of the GINA gap and the probability of re-identification and 
data hacking is that many consumers don’t know their genetic tests could 
prevent them from getting insured when they purchase products from 
23andMe.143  With pharmaceutical companies like GSK now having access 
to 23andMe’s genetic database, the available privacy to consumers is 
dwindling. 
 
VI. BENEFITS OF GENOME TESTING 
 
 Part of 23andMe’s marketing strategy is encouraging consumers to 
become their own best medical advocates.144  The idea is that once a person 
knows of a risk or predisposition, they will take steps to reduce or eliminate 
the threat of poor health.  This is in fact one of the upsides to the partnership 
between 23andMe and GSK, future consumers will be able to better treat 
their illnesses using pharmaceuticals most suitable to their DNA.145  This 
thinking is not without reason, studies have shown that consumers generally 
take steps to improve their health upon receiving their genome results from 
23andMe and other DNA testing companies.146  If consumers use their 
genetic testing to improve their health, there is reduced concern for life and 
disability insurance companies that their applicants are bad bets. 
 
A. Advancements in Genetic Testing Require a Vast Data Pool 
 
 DNA testing has made invaluable advancements and improvements 
in a span of just a few years.  Undoubtedly, the study of pharmacogenetics 
will improve health outcomes. 23andMe’s genome research has led to 
major discoveries and two clinical research communities for Parkinson’s 
disease and sarcoma.147  As the technology develops, researchers have 
greater demand for access and easier sharing of all kinds of data.148  Genetic 
research functions best when data scientists have access to self-reported 
data.149  Self-reported data helps scientists distinguish genes across a vast 
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database.150  One scholar explains this as, if researchers know a group of 
study participants have Alzheimer’s, they know which genes to study and 
which to exclude.151  Combining genetic data with personal information 
like medical history, diet, and exercise shows the correlation between 
genetic and environmental factors on overall health.152  Likewise, observing 
a study participant over a long period of time and having continual access 
to self-reported health updates demonstrates how data and conditions 
change over time.153  When researchers and scientists have access to 
complete and reliable information, their studies are more conclusive and 
can do more to advance the study of genomics.154 
 
B. The Future of Genomics 
 
 In January of 2020, 23andMe announced it had sold the rights to a 
drug that treats inflammatory diseases.155  The drug was developed using 
the company’s consumer database.156  In announcing this new 
development, the company is celebrating going “from database to discovery 
to developing a drug.”157  Critics are fair to point out that there is ethical 
ambiguity in the company using data they were paid to process as the basis 
for new drug discoveries from which they will invariably further profit.158 
But even with the criticism, the creation of a drug that was manufactured 
using the human genome is an incredible scientific and medical 
advancement.159 
 The next phase of genome testing has been in the works for some 
years now, with advances in the research of polygenic diseases.160  Large-
scale genetic testing as it is known, looks for the relationship between 
varied genes to determine the cause of complex diseases.161  Research of 
this level requires a large database and information about environmental 
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causes.162  The ENCODE program, whose goal it is to identify functional 
elements of the human genome sequence, recently determined that “many 
human genomic regions previously assumed to be nonfunctional have 
recently been found to be teeming with biochemical activity.” 163  Genome 
research is the new frontier.  It is important work that, while coming with 
significant risks, should be supported and given room to explore new 




 Consumers seek to control the publicly available data about 
themselves to mitigate judgment, ridicule, and stereotyping.164  As a nation 
though, Americans value the free flow of information and scientific 
development.165  The growth of genome testing necessitates updated 
regulation and legislation, but any steps taken by the government need to 
balance the individual’s right to privacy with the societal benefit of medical 
advances.  One scholar goes so far as to posit that the societal benefit of 
genome testing is greater than any privacy loss.166  While certainly not all 
share this belief, it does stress the importance of finding privacy solutions 
that will encourage this important research. 
 
A. Proposals for Informed Consent in the Internet Age 
 
 One proposition for a more-informed consent process is an offline 
approach. Consumers consent to 23andMe’s entire product line through the 
web which can create a false sense of casual exchange.167  Paying a 
company to take a permanent record of your DNA and consenting to join 
their research takes a few clicks, it is as easy as composing a tweet but can 
have much more serious ramifications.168  The choice to submit to genetic 
testing and genome research is a serious decision that has implications for 
the individual consumer and their family members.169  Consider the Golden 
State Killer who was caught when detectives compared DNA from a crime 
scene with publicly available DNA samples on GEDmatch.170  A relative 
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of the defendant uploaded raw genetic data to the GEDmatch website. 
Accessing such databases has become a tool for law enforcement and this 
enabled the arrest of a serial rapist and murderer whose cases had gone cold 
decades ago.171  Although genome profiles submitted to 23andMe are not 
publicly available, the company’s privacy statement does warn consumers 
that the company will, when required by law, comply with valid court 
orders, subpoenas, or search warrants.172  
 To get truly informed consent, 23andMe should enhance its 
informed consent process, and there are many options.  For instance, 
consumers could be required to go through a phone interview with a staff 
genetic counselor or research aide.173  The genetic counselor or aide would 
be available from the client intake through the delivery of test results.  This 
option remedies complaints against the sterility of the current DTC genetic 
testing process.  For many people, receiving news about their genetic 
profile through an email or letter is cold and alienating.  Because of the 
propensity to receive life-altering news, such as a bad health outcome, news 
of parental infidelity, or reminders of the horrors inflicted on people of 
African descent during the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, providing phone calls 
with a genetic counselor could lend a great deal of comfort.174  Another 
option would be requiring consumers to re-type a provided sentence that 
explains the privacy and discrimination risks of re-identification.175  A third 
option is an interactive multiple choice quiz which must be perfected before 
enrollment is complete.176  Lastly, 23andMe could seek updated consent 
when future developments and uses for genetic testing become available.177 
This last option is perhaps a bit clunky,178 but because 23andMe offers 
consumers the opportunity to engage in research through an app, the 
company could obtain updated consent fairly easily. 
 The rapid development of new technologies and discoveries and the 
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information feel like the Wild West.  In a culture where consumers risk so 
much by participating in the study of the human genome, gaining informed 




B. Food and Drug Administration 
 
 The FDA has demonstrated through their 2013 warning letter and 
2018 approval of the study for pharmacogenetics that they are willing to 
regulate DTC genetic testing.179  The federal agency informed 23andMe 
that its personal genome service would be considered a Class III device.180 
Class III devices are of “substantial importance in preventing impairment 
of human life.”181  From 2003 up until the warning letter, the FDA had 
cleared genetic tests as Class II devices that are designed to perform without 
injury or harm to the user.182  The concern the FDA has regarding 23andMe 
and other DTC genetic testing companies is false negatives and false 
positives.183  Because users tend to take their genetic test results and apply 
health changes, often without consulting a doctor, there is an emphasis on 
reliable test results.184 
 
C. Congressional Action 
 
 For all the benefits it provides, GINA has several shortcomings. 
Once deemed “the first civil rights bill of the new century,” GINA leaves 
consumers exposed to discrimination in life and disability insurance, in 
financial transactions, and the public sphere.185  GINA does not protect 
Americans from discrimination based on the actual manifestation of 
disease.186  Nor does GINA extend to all health insurance decision 
making.187  The Act allows health insurers to obtain genome testing 
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information about applicants and consumers through incidental means.188 
GINA does not extend to data on the internet, such as DNA that has been 
shared on GEDmatch or re-identified and posted online.189  
 The original version of GINA applied to all forms of insurance.190 
One advocate of this early form of the bill pointed out that the bill would 
not have passed as it was,191 but now, twelve years later and with all the 
advancements that have been made in genetic testing, it’s time for an 
update.  Some critics of this idea claim that there’s no evidence of genetic 
discrimination in life insurance underwriting, so there’s no need to change 
the bill.192  Our understanding of the human genome is changing rapidly, 
and with that, we have more insight into a person’s health outcomes and 
life expectancy.193  Without protections, consumers will face backlash in 
the life and disability market.  Even if a consumer’s genetic profile is not 
stored in their medical records, the data exhaust ensures the availability of 
a consumer’s genome for insurance companies that want to find it.194 
 In addition to regulation on the DTC genetic testing companies 
themselves and amending GINA, Congress needs to pass a comprehensive 
ban on malicious re-identification of consumer genetic material.  Observing 
others around us, and particularly those we encounter online, is a natural 
facet of life.195  But deliberate observation, observation that is intended to 
invade a person’s sense of seclusion or cause harm, is offensive and should 
be subject to civil liability.196  Malicious re-identification laws would grant 
a remedy to consumers whose data was accessed in a cyber-attack, such as 
in the 2014 cyber-attack on Ancestry.197  Not all deliberate or malicious 
observation is done by humans in the 21st Century.198  Algorithms and 
automated processes can infringe a sense of privacy.199  Even when a 
consumer is unaware that that a deliberate observation has occurred, it is in 
the public’s best interest to quash that sort of behavior.200  Malicious re-
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
 23andMe is one of the largest DTC genetic testing companies in the 
world.  The company has over 10,000,000 consumer profiles in their 
database which garners them funding by the National Institutes of Health 
and partnerships with pharmaceutical companies like GlaxoSmithKline. 
However, this accumulation of consumer data leads to concerns about data 
hacking and cyber-attacks.  Data hacking, which the Supreme Court has 
held is legal, allows life insurance companies to discriminate against 
applicants based on their genetic profile.  23andMe should update its 
method of obtaining informed consent so consumers are fully aware of the 
risks of discrimination based on genetic testing. Consumer protections like 
GINA need to be amended to cover life and disability insurance companies. 
Further, Congress should pass a law outlawing malicious re-identification. 
The benefits of genetic testing are worth pursuing but consumer privacy 
needs to be ensured in the process. 
 
